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THE QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The question presented for review is whether the Court of 
Appeals erred in affirming the final administrative decision and 
Order of the Industrial Commission in selecting the date of the 
first medical report suggesting the unemployability of an injured 
worker; i.e., September 24, 1984, as the date for commencement of 
permanent total disability benefits where (1) the worker was 
injured on May 12, 1975; (2) the worker attempted unsuccessfully 
to return to work and last worked on April 22, 1976; (3) the 
worker has been receiving Social Security total disability bene-
fits effective April 1, 1976; and (4) the Second Injury Fund has 
stipulated to the commencement of its exposure for permanent 
total disability as of April 15, 1982, precisely six years after 
the initial six-year period for compensation due and payable 
exclusively by the Employer/Carrier by statute. 
This inquiry also places into question the underlying diffi-
culties associated with commencing permanent total disability 
benefits on any date other than the date of the industrial acci-
dent upon which such a finding is based^ or the date the employee 
last worked, whichever is later. 
REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL REPORTS OF OPINION 
ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals opinion of April 15, 1987 may be found 
in 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 59. 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The Court of Appeals opinion of April 15, 1987, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(5) (1986), is reviewable as a 
matter of discretion by a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
There are no statutes which require that permanent total 
disability benefits be awarded on a certain date; however, Peti-
tioner believes that Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1985), 
which due to its length appears in the Appendix, supports his 
position that the commencement date for permanent total disabil-
ity compensation is the date of the industrial accident which 
effectively rendered him incapable of returning to substantial, 
gainful employment. If, however, a worker attempts unsuccessful-
ly to return to work, the commencement date of his permanent 
total disability benefits is the date he last worked. See Norton 
v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 728 P.2d 1025 (1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This Petition involves the review of the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals affirming a final administrative decision of the 
Industrial Commission holding that the commencement date for the 
payment of permanent total disability benefits may be the date of 
a medical report, rather than the date of the industrial accident 
which unequivocably precipitated his unemployability, or the date 
he last worked. R. Vol. II, 568-577. Oman v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 55 Utah Adv. Rep. 59 (1987). 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Petitioner applied for and was awarded permanent total dis-
ability benefits. R. Vol I, 37; and Vol. II, 400-406. Subse-
quently, Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Motion for 
Review with the Industrial Commission questioning the commence-
ment date for the payment of permanent total disability bene-
fits. Thereafter, the Industrial Commission entered an Order 
changing the benefit commencement date to September 24, 1984, the 
earliest date of a medical report suggesting the Petitioner would 
never be able to work again. R. Vol. II, 576. Oman, supra at 55 
Utah Adv. 59. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Industrial Commission's 
Order regarding the commencement date. 
C. Relevant Facts to the Issues Presented 
On May 12, 1975 Petitioner was injured in an industrial 
accident while working as an underground coal miner with Peabody 
Coal Company at the Deer Creek Coal Mine in Huntington, Utah. 
The accident involved a cave-in in which three of his fellow 
workers lost their lives and others, like himself, were in-
jured. R. Vol. II, 408. 
During the month after the accident, the Petitioner was 
treated orthopedically for traumatic lumbosacral sprain with 
rediculitis unilateral on the left side (R. Vol. I, 47), and 
psychiatrically for depression caused by his feeling that he 
could have prevented one of his co-workers from being killed. He 
complained of low back pain, restlessness, anxiety, nervousness 
and an unwillingness to go back to work in the mine. R. Vol. II, 
408. 
On June 15, 1975 and notwithstanding his physical and mental 
problems, Petitioner returned to work in the mines where he con-
tinued to work without significant interruption until April 21, 
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1976. R. Vol. I, 136. During that time Petitioner continued to 
obtain chiropractic adjustments and therapy for his depression. 
In May, 1976 Petitioner sought follow-up medical treatment 
for his back which appeared to have some limitation in motion and 
additional tenderness in his left buttocks. He also had de-
creased sensation over the lateral aspect of his calf and foot on 
the left side. R. Vol. I, 167; Vol. II, 409; and Vol. I, 47. 
Subsequently, on June 29, 1976 a three-level fusion was 
performed by Dr. Thomas E. Soderberg at the L.D.S. Hospital in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. R. Vol. I, 48; and Vol. II, 167. Because 
two of the levels failed, a second surgery was performed on 
December 1, 1977, where Petitioner's back was again re-fused. R. 
Vol. II, 190-191 and 409. 
On March 21, 1977 as a result of those two surgeries, the 
Industrial Commission approved a Compensation Agreement awarding 
Petitioner a 25% permanent partial impairment of the whole body 
for his orthopedic problems. R. Vol. I, 24. 
On June 11, 1982 Petitioner filed an Application for a Hear-
ing requesting an additional permanent partial impairment award 
for his psychiatric problems and, also, requesting consideration 
of a permanent total disability a^ard. R. Vol. I, 37. 
Dr. Potts, Petitioner's treating physician of approximately 
five years, confirmed Petitioner's permanent total disability 
status by letter on September 24, 1984 by stating that he was 
"... unable to work or perform steadily...." and that he doubted 
that "... his position [would] improve". R. Vol. II, 156. Dr. 
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Bradford D. Hare of the University of Utah Pain Clinic confirmed 
Petitioner's inability to work, and indicated that the Petitioner 
is impaired in social, family and vocational functioning, in a 
medical report of February 13, 1985, further substantiating his 
total disability status. R. Vol. II, 613. 
Ms. JoAnn Pace of the Four Corners Community Mental Health 
Center in Castle Dale, Utah also confirmed Petitioner's permanent 
total disability status by letter of May 21, 1985 indicating that 
"... my impression at this time is that the employee is suffering 
from post traumatic stress disorder with depression. His rumina-
tion of the traumatic event, his anxiety and severe physical pain 
could most definitely prevent him from working at this time". R. 
Vol. II, 613-614. 
And finally, Dr. Ronald G. Rubin, a psychiatrist in Price, 
Utah, in a letter of July 10, 1985, pursuant to a Division of 
Rehabilitation referral, indicated that Petitioner was neither 
rehabilitable now nor was he expected to be so in the future, was 
not employable now or in the future, and was not able to partake 
in a new vocation, and was in fact 100% disabled. R. Vol. II, 
614. 
On October 9, 1984 the Administrative Law Judge denied Peti-
tioner's claim to an additional award for his psychiatric impair-
ment, but found him "... tentatively permanently and totally 
disabled and referred [him] to the Division of Rehabilitation 
Services for evaluation, training and certification as required 
by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A." R. Vol. II, 412. 
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On July 31, 1985 the Utah State Board of Education, Division 
of Rehabilitation Services, found that Petitioner was ineligible 
for rehabilitation because his handicap was "too severe" and a 
recent psychiatric evaluation revealed that he had "... no sig-
nificant work potential...." In addition to his physical and 
mental impairments, that Division also found that he had border-
line intellectual functioning and reading skills primarily as a 
result of his dropping out of school in the tenth grade. The 
Division issued the Section 67 certification by concluding that 
there was no "... reasonable expectation that vocational rehabil-
itation services [could] benefit [him] in terms of employabil-
ity." R. Vol. II, 562. 
The Industrial Commission readily acknowledges the follow-
ing: 
A. The Petitioner "... never returned to work follow-
ing the surgery on June 29, 1976." R. Vol. II, 409 (emphasis 
added). 
B. The Petitioner was entitled to "... a tentative 
finding of permanent and total disability simply because the 
Applicant has not been gainfully employed for the past eight [now 
11] years." R. Vol. II, 412 (emphasis added). 
On December 11, 1985 the Administrative Law Judge entered 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order finding that 
the Petitioner was "... entitled to benefits for permanent total 
disability benefits from and after July 31, 1985...." R. Vol. 
II, 564. The date chosen by the Adminsitrative Law Judge for the 
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commencement of benefits was the date of the Section 67 Division 
of Rehabilitation certification of non-entitlement to rehabilita-
tion services. R. Vol. II, 562. 
On December 19, 1985 Petitioner filed his Motion for Recon-
sideration/Motion for Review challenging the onset date of perm-
anent total disability benefits. R. Vol. II, 569-573. Petition-
er argued that computing permanent total disability benefits 
based upon the date of the rehabilitation letter was inconsistent 
with longstanding Industrial Commission policy wherein permanent 
total disability benefits onset dates are computed from the date 
of the industrial accident or the date an employee last worked. 
On March 13, 1986 the Industrial Commission granted in part 
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration/Motion for Review. R. 
Vol. II, 574-576. Specifically, the Industrial Commission held 
11
... that the first date of medical confirmation of the Appli-
cant's permanent total disability status is a more appropriate 
date to begin permanent total disability benefits...." R. Vol. 
II, 576. 
On April 15, 1987 the Court of Appeals affirmed the final 
administrative decision of the Industrial Commission. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED AN 
IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW WHICH HAS 
NOT BEEN, BUT SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THIS COURT 
Rule 43(4) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court provides 
for review by a writ of certiorari when the Court of Appeals has 
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decided "... an important question of state law which has not 
been, but should be, settled by this Court.11 
The important question in this case, which has never been 
addressed by this or any other Court of this state, decided by 
the Court of Appeals is when the payment of permanent total dis-
ability benefits should commence. Oman, supra at 55 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 60. The standard established by the Court of Appeals in 
Oman is not found in any statute or case law decision, and is 
inconsistent with other provisions of the Utah Workers1 Compensa-
tion Act and the Act's remedial nature. In addition, this new 
standard created by the Court of Appeals is not even supported by 
the record, to wit: 
1. That the date of a medical report containing the conclu-
sion of a medical doctor that the Petitioner was totally disabled 
does not and cannot infer that the Petitioner was not permanently 
and totally disabled prior to the date that the medical report 
was authored; 
2. That a permanent total disability claim is one involving 
factors outside of a medical doctor's expertise, and comments 
relative to an injured worker's disability status are not fac-
tually and cannot be legally dispositive of that question; 
3. Assuming arguendo that permanent total disability bene-
fits may be commenced on some date other than the date of an 
applicant's industrial accident, such an argument appears to 
require that benefits are payable by an employer and its workers' 
compensation carrier in excess of the statutory maximum of 312 
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weeks provided for in Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-67 
(1985) . 
Also, this new standard created by the Court of Appeals 
raises numerous unanswered questions which unfortunately leave 
all parties to this case and others claiming permanent total 
disability compensation in the unenviable position of being 
totally unable to discern their respective rights and liabili-
ties, to wit: 
1. Which of the identified parties — the Employer/Carrier 
or the Second Injury Fund — is required to begin permanent total 
disability benefits on September 24, 1984. 
2. For what period of time respectively are the identified 
parties — the Employer/Carrier or the Second Injury Fund — re-
quired to pay permanent total disability benefits commencing on 
September 24, 1984. 
3. To what extent, if any, are the parties — the Employ-
er/Carrier or the Second Injury Fund — entitled to reduce their 
permanent total disability obligation in this case with payments 
previously made to the Plaintiff as temporary total disability 
compensation and permanent partial impairment compensation for 
periods of time which preceded the commencement date for perm-
anent total disability of September 24, 1984. 
And finally, Petitioner recently became aware of a decision 
issued by the Industrial Commission referencing a wholly differ-
ent standard regarding the onset date of disability in permanent 
total disability claims. That standard is different from that 
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announced in this case by the Court of Appeals. Specifically, in 
Brundage v. Granite School District, Case No. 85000742 (November 
10, 1986), the Industrial Commission held "that the permanent 
total disability did not begin until after the Applicant stopped 
working," the exact standard urged by the Petitioner in this 
case. A copy of the Industrial Commission's decision is part of 
the Appendix. 
This recent decision by the Industrial Commission further 
underscores the arbitrary and capricious nature of its decision, 
and of the Court of Appeals' opinion, in the present case. 
Billings Computer Corporation v. Tarango, Utah, 674 P. 2d 104 
(1983). 
II 
THE PANEL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED 
A QUESTION OF STATE LAW IN A WAY THAT IS IN 
CONFLICT WITH A DECISION OF THIS COURT 
Rule 43(2) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court provides 
for review by a writ of certiorari when "... a panel of the Court 
of Appeals has decided a question of state . . . law ... in a way 
that is in conflict with a decision of this Court." 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is Oman holding that 
the date of a medical report may properly be utilized as the date 
for the commencement of permanent total disability benefits is, 
in addition to being contrary to specific statutory references 
contained in Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1985), is also 
directly contrary to the recent decision of this Court in Norton 
v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 725 P. 2d 1025 (1986) where this 
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Court in a per curiam decision specifically held that an injured 
worker's unsuccessful attempts to continue working will not pre-
vent a subsequent finding of entitlement to permanent total dis-
ability compensation. Because compensation cannot be paid during 
any period of time during which an employee is working, it is 
clear that permanent total disability benefits may only commence 
on the day after the injured worker last worked. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no established standard by which to determine the 
commencement date for permanent total disability benefits. The 
Industrial Commission seems to apply different standards for each 
case and the Court of Appeals has established a standard in Oman 
that raises more questions than answers and presents more prob-
lems than solutions. 
Furthermore, the standard announced by the Court of Appeals 
is in conflict with that announced by this Court in the Norton 
decision. 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court decide the 
important question raised herein and judicially determine that 
permanent total disability benefits begin on the day after an in-
jured worker's impairment has forced him out of the work force. 
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DATED this 15th day of May, 1987. 
I hereby certify that I served four (4) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing document, postage prepaid, on this the 
15th day of May, 1987, upon the following: 
David L. Wilkinson, Esq. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
124 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Henry K. Chai III, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84/10 
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APPENDIX 
Court of Appeals Opinion dated April 15, 1987. 
Industrial Commission Order granting Motion for Review dated 
March 13, 1986. 
Industrial Commission Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law and Order dated December 11, 1985. 
Industrial Commission Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order dated October 23, 1984. 
Industrial Commission Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order dated October 9, 1984. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1985). 
Norton v. Industrial Commission, Utah, 728 P. 2d 1025 
(1986). 
Brundage v. Granite School District, Case No. 85000742 
(November 10, 1986). 
-13-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
—,„OO0oo 
Charles G. Oman, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Peabody Coal Company, Old 
Republic Insurance Company and 
Second Injury Fund, 
Defendants. 
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood and Bench. 
OPINION 
Case No. 860189-CA 
F I L E D 
APR 151987 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Plaintiff seeks modification of an order by the 
Industrial Commission awarding him permanent total disability 
benefits. The benefits were to commence as of September 24, 
1984, the date permanent total disability was first medically 
confirmed. Plaintiff urges benefits should commence from 
either the day of the industrial accident (May 12, 1975) or the 
day after he last worked for the employer (April.22, 1976), 
whichever is later. Under that theory benefits would commence 
as of April 23, 1976. Plaintiff also seeks payment of interest 
on the benefits, which was denied by the Industrial Commission. 
Plaintiff was injured in a mine cave-in on May 12, 1975 
in Huntington, Utah, while working for Peabody Coal Company 
("Peabody"). He was treated orthopedically for back problems 
and also received treatment for depression. He returned 
to work on June 15, 1975, but continued to receive medical 
treatment. On June 29, 1976, a three level fusion operation 
was performed on plaintiff, and in December, 1977, further 
surgery occurred, re-fusing plaintiff's back. Plaintiff was 
awarded compensation for a 25% permanent partial impairment of 
the whole body for his back problems on March 21, 1977. 
On June 11, 1982 plaintiff applied for a permanent total 
disability award because of psychiatric impairment. 
Plaintiff's total disability was confirmed by a letter dated 
September., -9 / 1984, from his physician. The doctor's 
confirmation was corroborated by other medical and mental 
heal.fclj professionals. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), in 
- * 'accordance ^with Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1986), made a 
tentative finding of permanent total disability and referred 
"i "^ plouixitiff ^bb the Division of Rehabilitative Services for 
';, evaluation training and certification. The Division found 
\ ^ that g^ alriitiff could not be rehabilitated for employment. The 
^Al£2sSc£red findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order 
providing plaintiff with benefits from July 21, 1985, the date 
of certification by the Division of Rehabilitation. No 
interest on unpaid benefits was awarded. Plaintiff then filed 
a Motion for Reconsideration/Motion for Review challenging the 
commencement date of benefits and failure to order payment of 
interest. In response the Industrial Commission denied payment 
of interest but changed the benefit commencement date to 
September 24, 1984, the first date of medical confirmation. 
Plaintiff asks this Court to rule that benefits should 
commence from April 23, 1976, the day after plaintiff's last 
day of work for Peabody. Plaintiff cites Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-64 (1986) as mandating commencement of workers' 
compensation no later than three days after the injury. 
However, that section deals with total temporary disability 
rather than total permanent disability as in this case. Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1986) also uses Mat the time of injury-
language to establish benefits, but only in conjunction with 
wages at the time of injury. There is no statutory language 
requiring benefits to commence at either the date of injury or 
the last day of employment, whichever occurs later. Therefore, 
plaintiff's argument is without merit. Thus, this Court must 
determine if the Commission's order was supported by 
substantial evidence and was a reasonable exercise of the 
Commission's discretion. Norton v. Indust. Commission, 728 
P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986); Hardman v. Salt Lake Citv Fleet 
Management, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981). 
In this instance, while the accident causing the initial 
injury occurred in 1975, it was not until years later that the 
injury developed to a point of total disability. The ALJ 
considered evidence that plaintiff had operated a business and 
received income between 1976 (when he stopped working for 
Peabody) and 1984. The ALJ's findings state that H[a]ll of the 
evidence presented by the defendants was convincing in showing 
the [plaintiff] is far from being totally invalid." Benefits 
were awarded nonetheless, consistent with the standard referred 
to in Norton, 728 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1986). In Norton, the Court 
stated that a worker may receive benefits who is not completely 
incapacitated but is sufficiently handicapped so "that he will 
not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the labor 
market." Norton, 728 P.2d at 1027. Plaintiff was not totally 
860189-CA 2 
and permanently disabled in 1976. His psychiatric problems, 
which emanated from the 1975 industrial accident, became 
progressively worse, finally culminating in total permanent 
disability. As found by the ALJ, -[plaintiff] did not become 
permanently and totally disabled until after the expiration of 
the initial six year period.- The Industrial Commission did 
not act unreasonably nor abuse its discretion by selecting the 
September 24, 1984, date for commencement of benefits given the 
progressivenature of plaintiffs disability and the difficulty 
of determining the exact date of maturation of the disability. 
A possible gap between full development of the disability and 
payment of benefits will not justify reversal. Booms v. Rapp 
720 P.2d 1636 (Utah 1986). We concur in the language of 
Spencer v. Indust. Commission, 87 Utah 336 40 P.2d 188 (1935): 
...whether an employee is totally disabled 
or permanently disabled are ultimate matters 
to be decided by the commissioner, as is also 
the amount and time compensation may be 
awarded upon all the evidence. I£ at 197. 
It is within the sound discretion of the Industrial 
Commission to determine the commencement date of benefits for 
total permanent disability so long as the determination is 
supported by substantial evidence and not patently 
unreasonable. Substantial evidence existed in this case for 
commencing benefits as of the first date of medical 
confirmation of permanent total disability. 
Plaintiff also appeals from the Industrial Commission's 
denial of interest on unpaid benefits. Plaintiff relies on 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78 (1986) which states: 
Awards made by the Industrial Commission 
shall include interest at the rate of 8% 
per annum from the date when each benefit 
payment would have otherwise become due 
and payable. 
In Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 704 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1985) the Utah Supreme Court held that this statute must be 
retroactively applied to accrued or pending actions because its 
intent is remedial. The case before us clearly falls within 
the statutory language and pursuant to Marshall enactment of 
the statute subsequent to the injury or disability is 
860189-CA 3 
irrelevant. Plaintiff is entitled to payment of accrued 
interest on all unpaid benefits commencing from September 24, 
1984. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part* No costs awarded. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
R. W. Garff, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
860189-CA 4 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 32002249 
* 





PEABODY COAL COMPANY and/or * 
OLD REPUBLIC INSURANCE and * 
SECOND INJURS FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On December 11, 1985, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission 
issued Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order awarding 
the Applicant in the above captioned case permanent total disability benefits, 
to be paid by the Second Injury Fund beginning July 31, 1985, the date when 
the State Office of Education Rehabilitation Services certified that the 
Applicant was not susceptible to rehabilitation. On December 20, 1985, the 
Applicant's attorney filed a Motion for Review objecting to the date payments 
were ordered to begin. The Counsel for the Applicant argues that the 
Commission practice has. been to award permanent total disability benefits 
either beginning the date the employee was injured, or the date the employee 
ceased working. The Counsel for the Applicant also requested an award of 
interest on the benefits awarded. The Commission is of the opinion that an 
earlier date is appropriate for the beginning of the permanent total 
disability benefits, however the Commission declines adding interest to the 
award. A brief review of the fila follows. 
The Applicant was injured, while in the course of his employment, on 
May 12, 19 75 in a mine cave-in. The Applicant injured his back, and had two 
back surgeries as a result. The Applicant also experienced considerable 
psychiatric problems resulting from the trauma involved in the cave-in (in 
which several miners were killed). The Applicant returned to work 
approximately one month after the cave-in, and worked for almost a year 
afterwards, during which time he saw a chiropractor. In June 1976, the 
Applicant had back surgery (performed by Dr. T. Soderberg) and the Applicant 
was deemed stabilized in December 1976. The Defendant/carrier paid temporary 
total compensation in 1975 and 1976 for the periods the Applicant did not 
work, and also paid for a 25% permanent partial impairment rated by Dr. 
Soderberg in Oecember 1976. The Applicant required additional surgery in 
ORDER 
GRANTING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
CHARLES G. OMAN 
ORDER: 
PAGE TWO 
December 1977 as a result of non-fusion, and the Defendant/carrier paid for 
the surgery and the attendant temporary total disability. The Applicant was 
declared stable in September 1978, and no further permanent partial 
impairment, beyond the 25% already awarded, resulted. 
On August 13, 1982, the Applicant, through counsel, filed an 
Application for Hearing with the Commission, claiming permanent total 
disability benefits, or additional permanent partial impairment benefits. In 
support of the claim, in November 1983, the Counsel for the Applicant 
submitted two physician reports. Both reports discussed the Applicant's 
psychiatric impairment resulting from the May 12, 1975 accident, and one of 
the reports rated the impairment at 25% of the whole man. The Defendants 
denied a claim for further permanent partial impairment benefits based on the 
3 year Statute of Limitation specified in U.C.A. 35-1-66. The Counsel for the 
Applicant argued that the Statute of Limitation did not apply because the 
issue was permanent total disability for which the Supreme Court determined no 
Statute of Limitation applied, and because the Commission had continuing 
jurisdiction under U.C.A. 35-1-78. A Hearing was held September 24r, 1984, and 
the Administrative Law Judge issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order on October 9, 1984. The Administrative Law Judge made a tentative 
finding of permanent total disability, and the Applicant was referred to the 
State Office of Education Rehabilitation Services. On November 14, 1985, a 
second Hearing was held to allow testimony regarding the Applicant's 
employability. This issue arose when- it was determined the Applicant may have 
had some involvement in several businesses in which his wife and daughter were 
engaged. 
The final Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order, now at issue, was filed on December 11, 1985. In that Order, the 
Administrative Law Judge found the Applicant permanently totally disabled as a 
result of Rehabilitation Services* inability to rehabilitate the Applicant 
after nearly one year of attempts. The Administrative Law Judge ordered the 
Second Injury Fund to begin permanent total disability benefits as of July 31, 
1985, the date Rehabilitation Services certified the Applicant as not 
susceptible to rehabilitation. On December 20, 1985, the Commission received 
the Applicant's Motion for Review arguing for an earlier date when permanent 
total disability should begin, and requesting an award of interest on the 
final aw?rd. The Counsel for the Applicant submits a long list of alternative 
earlier dates that should have been selected by the Administrative Law Judge 
as the beginning of permanent total disability. These include, May 12, 1975 
the date of injury; sometime in 1976 when the Applicant ceased working; June 
11, 1982 the data of the Application for Hearing; August 19, 1982 the date the 
Application was filed; September 24, 1984 when the Applicant's treating 
physician first found the Applicant to be permanently totally disabled; 
October 23, 1984, the date the Administrative Law Judge tentatively found the 
Applicant to be permanently totally disabled; November 15, 1984, the date the 
Applicant was referred to Rehabilitation Services, February 13, 1985, when the 
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University of Utah Pain Clinic doctor found the Applicant disabled; May 21, 
1985, when a community health center employee found the Applicant was 
prevented from working and finally, June 10, 1985 when a psychiatrist found 
the Applicant was not employable or rehabilitative. 
The Commission is of the opinion that the first date of medical 
confirmation of the Applicants permanent total disability status is a more 
appropriate date to begin permanent total disability benefits- The Commission 
therefore finds the benefits should begin as of September 24, 1984. The 
Commission finds that an award of interest is inappropriate, and therefore the 
final Commission award is as follows. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury 
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as 
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to place Applicant on the Second Injury 
Fund payroll and to pay Applicant compensation at the rate of $120.00 per week 
commencing September 24, 1984, and continuing thereafter at intervals of'not 
more than every four weeks until further order of the Commission. The accrued 
amount shall be payable in a lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants, Peabody Coal Company 
and/or Old Republic Insurance, pay ail medical "expenses incurred as the result 
of this accident, said expenses to be paid in accordance with the Medical and 
Surgical Fee Schedule of the Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Virginius Dabney, attorney for the 
Applicant, be paid the sum of $5,994.00, payable directly by the Applicant in 
installments of such amount as may be agreeable between the Applicant and his 
attorney, but no less than $450.00 out of the accrued amount payable and 
thereafter in installments of no less than $80.00 per month. Should there be 
any failure to pay as agreed or per the minimum stated above, there shall be a 
suspension of benefits to the Applicant and benefits will be payable to his 
attorney as may be ordered by the Commissioner 
Stephen M. Hadley, Chairman x 
^ ^ £ 4 ^ W 
Waiter. T. Axeigard/^Comsp&s^ionBr 
Lenice L. Nielsen, Commissioner 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of .atah, Salt Lake City, Utah this 
//ffidav of Harch, 1^86 
Linda J. StrasbUrg, Commission/Secretary 
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Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 24, 
1984, at 1:00 p.m.; same being pursuant to Order and 
Notice of the Commission. 
Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge. 
The Applicant was present and represented by Virginius 
Dabney, Attorney at Law 
The Defendants Peabody Coal Company and/ or Old 
Republic Insurance were represented by Henry K. Chai, 
II, Attorney at Law. 
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Gilbert A. 
Martinez, Administrator. 
Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on November 14, 
1985, at 10:00 a.m.; same being pursuant to Order and 
Notice of the Commission. 
Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge. 
The Applicant was present and represented by Virginius 
Dabney, Attorney at Law 
The Defendants Peabody Coal Company and/or Old 
Republic Insurance were represented by Henry K. Chai, 
II, Attorney at Law. 
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Erie V. 
Baorman, Administrator. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT; 
1. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order were entered in 
this matter on October 9, 1984, and an Amended Order was entered on October 
23, 1984. Insofar as the Findings of Fact expressed in the two prior Orders 
are not inconsistent with the Findings made herein, the same are incorporated 
herein by reference as though fully set forth. 
2. The original Order made a tentative finding that the Applicant 
was permanently and totally disabled, and he was referred to the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training, and certification as 
required by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. There was a specific finding made that no 
compensation for permanent total disability was to be awarded until a final 
determination was made relative to that issue. 
3. At the last hearing on November 14, 1985, evidence was intro-
duced relative to the rehabilitation evaluation. The Applicant underwent 
feasibility studies and was placed in a program where he received tutoring in 
basic skills. He made positive but slow progress for a while; but finally on 
July 31, 1985, Rehabilitation Services certified that the Applicant did not 
meet or no longer met the legal requirement of a reasonable expectation that 
vocational rehabilitation services would benefit him in terms of employ-
ability. The reason for the certification that the Applicant is not a good 
candidate for rehabilitation appears to be threefold: (1) He has borderline 
intellectual functioning and reading skills; (2) he suffers from a long-term 
depressive neurosis; and (3) he lacks funds that might otherwise enable him to 
pursue a long-term rehabilitation program. 
4. At the last hearing the Defendants presented a substantial 
amount of evidence relative to the Applicant's activities over the past 
several years. The thrust of this evidence was to establish that the 
Applicant was in fact a partner with his wife in the operation of Kelly's Bar 
in Castledale, Utah, and that he had also formerly been involved with his wife 
in the operation of Chick's Fish *H Chips. The evidence also strongly implies 
that the Applicant derived an unspecified amount of income from Christmas tree 
sales. The Applicant testified that the Christmas tree sales were actually an 
attempt on the part of his teenage daughter to earn some income and that he 
was not involved in this business even though many of the customers wrote out 
checks in his name in payment for the trees. He further testified that the 
bar and restaurant operations were operated solely by his wife and that his 
name appeared on licenses, tax returns, sales invoices, lease agreements, 
et cetera, only for the purpose of credit or other business needs but was 
never intended toJrtan actual partnership. Some of the evidence presented 
showed rather clearly that a lot of personal expenses were being run through 
the business accounts, and the evidence rather clearly indicated the Applicant 
spent quite a bit of time at the bar and that perhaps he even helped out on 
occasion to a limited extent. It seems rather clear from the evidence that 
the townspeople regarded the Applicant and his wife as the owners and 
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operators of these businesses even though the Applicant's time involvement was 
much less than that of his wife. 
5. Tax returns filed by the Applicant and his wife were submitted 
after the hearing for the years 1979 through 1984, In each case these were 
joint returns, but for each year they showed the income and expenses of 
Kelly's Bar as a sole proprietorship operated by Charles Oman. The returns 
reflect substantial gross receipts from the bar, but the net income for the 
years 1979 through 1982 showed either a loss or only nominal net income. 
Clearly, if the only thing derived by the Applicant and his wife from the 
operation of the bar was the amount reflected as net profit on the tax return, 
the operation of the bar could not be justified. The net profit would not 
even have been the equivalent of a minimum wage paid to part-time hired help. 
The average net profit for the years 1979 through 1983 was only 2-57 percent, 
of gross sales. There was an unexplained increase in net profit during 1983 
and 1984 even though gross sales remained about the same as they had been 
previously-. The net profit in 1983 jumped to 12.36 percent of gross sales, 
and the net profit jumped to 2Q.07 percent in 1984. The last two figures are 
believable and would justify the operation of the business. Although .the 
income from the first four years is suspect, there mayt be an adequate 
explanation; but such an explanation is not deemed important to the issue 
relative to the Applicant's permanent total disability. 
6. All of the evidence presented from the Applicant's doctors and 
from rehabilitation counselors supports the Applicant's claim for permanent 
total disability. The prospects of successful rehabilitation are not -good, 
but there is the suggestion that such might still be accomplished if the 
Applicant had sufficient funds to sustain him during a long-term rehabilita-
tion program* 
7. A considerable amount of time was spent at the last hearing 
reviewing a substantial number of checks made out to the Applicant, many of 
which were under $100.00 but seme of which were in excess of $100.00 and in 
some cases more than $500.00. The Applicant said that these did not represent 
income in any way but were checks simply written out by customers who wanted 
cash and the Applicant and his wife were willing to cash these checks for 
them. The Administrative Law Judge is hardly convinced of any sound business 
purpose being furthered by this practice, but there is no specific evidence of 
any other purpose. These checks are in addition to the hundred or so checks 
written out to the Applicant for Christmas trees. Most of the Christmas trees 
appear to have sold for $15-00, with the price range being $10.00 to $20.00. 
8. All of the evidence presented by the Defendants was convincing 
in showing the Applicant is far from being totally invalid. His activity 
level is such that Dave Owens, a captain in the Emery County Sheriff's Office, 
did not even know that he was disabled even though he saw him frequently. 
Lamar Guymon, sheriff of Emery County, testified that he had observed the 
Applicant limping as he walked but he also saw the Applicant frequently during 
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the course of a month and knew of his involvement in the operation of Kelly's 
Bar. 
9. In consideration of all of the evidence presented, the 
Administrative Law Judge finds that the Applicant is permanently and totally 
disabled, but at the same time believes this determination should be subject 
to the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission. This is admittedly 
paradoxical but is based upon the belief that the Applicant's unemployability 
is in large part a result of his long-term depressive neurosis condition and 
that such might change if the Applicant had a strong enough desire to become 
employed despite his known physical limitations. It obviously will not change 
absent a change in attitude. 
10. The Applicant's combined physical and mental, impairment is 
44 percent of whole body function* The Defendants entered into a compensation 
agreement with the Applicant in 1977 by which he was paid permanent partial 
disability for his 25 percent physical impairment, but nothing has ever been 
paid for his depressive neurosis. The Applicant's rate of compensation was 
$95.33 per week. This is less than the minimum amount payable as of the time 
the Applicant was certified as not being a candidate for rehabilitation on 
July 31, 1985. The minimum rate in effect at that time was $120.00 per week. 
The Defendant Insurance Carrier and its insured have no further liability in 
this matter except for the payment of ongoing medical expenses because the 
Applicant did not become permanently and totally disabled until after the 
expiration of the initial six-year period. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAM: 
The Applicant is entitled to benefits for permanent total disability 
from and after July 31, 1985f subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the 
Commission to review and amend as circumstances may require. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury 
Fund preprre the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as 
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to place Applicant on the Second Injury 
Fund payroll and to pay Applicant compensation at the rate of $120.00 -pBV week 
commencing July 31
 f 1985, and continuing thereafter at intervals of not more 
than every four weeks until further Order of the Commission. The accrued 
amount shall be payable in a lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants Peabody Coal Company and/or 
Old Republic Insurance pay all medical expenses incurred as the result of this 
accidentt said expenses to be paid in accordance with the Medical and Surgical 
Fee Schedule of this Commission. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Virginius Dabney, attorney for the 
Applicant, be paid the sum of $5,994.00, payable directly by the Applicant in 
installments of such amount as may be agreeable between the Applicant and his 
attorney, but no less than $450•00 out of the accrued amount payable and 
thereafter in installments of no less than $80.00 per month. Should there be 
any failure to pay as agreed or per the minimum stated above, there shall be a 
suspension of benefits to the Applicant and benefits will be payable to his 
attorney as may be ordered by the Commission. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
Richard G. Sumsion 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah.Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
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FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The applicant herein was injured in an industrial accident on May 
12, 1975 during the course of his employment by Peabody Coal Company. The 
occurrence of the accident - is not questioned but the extent of injuries 
sustained as a result of the accident are subject to considerable doubt. 
2c The accident involved a cave-in in which three of the miners lost 
their lives and others were injured. One of those who was killed was only a 
few feet away from the applicant and was trying to rescue others at the time 
he was killed. The applicant may not have been able to prevent him from 
getting into the situation leading to his death, but apparently the applicant 
felt that he could have prevented him from doing so and this has caused him to 
have a lot of guilt feelings. After this employee was killed in the cave-in 
the applicant turned to run and was struck across the back by one of the mine 
timbers. One might suspect that the applicant would have been seriously 
injured by this timber but there was certainly no immediate indication of 
such. The applicant did say that he experienced a lot of low back pain but on 
the other hand he continued working in the search and rescue effort for three 
or four more hours and when he finally did go to the Emery Medical Center his 
main complaints were emotional not physical. The night of the accident, he 
was treated for hyperventilation and given Valium and the Clinic did not even 
make note of any low back pain or injury. In fact, the applicant was in such 
a state of emotional unrest and confusion that he drove to Page, Arizona for 
unknown reasons. His wife was so concerned about him that she followed him to 
Page. However, the applicant was seen by a chiropractor in Price on May 15, 
1975 and was treated for "traumatic lumbo sacral sprain with rediculitis 
unilateral on the left side." He continued - seeing a chiropractor quite 
regularly for the next several months. Because of his depression, he also 
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went to the Four Corners Mental Health Clinic in Price. There he complained 
of restlessness and feelings of anxiety and nervousness and an unwillingness 
to go bacic into the mine. He complained of not sleeping and having dreams of 
the horrible incident at the mine. He was also having marital problems and he 
embarked upon a course of psychotherapy for the purpose of getting him back 
into the mine and helping him with his marriage. This program was successful 
and he did return to work in the mine by June 15. He then worked without 
interruption until around April of 1976. During that time he continued to 
obtain some chiropractic adjustments but it is unknown as to just what extent 
or at what frequency- these adjustments were administered. The records of the 
chiropractor, now deceased, have not been located. 
3. There is no indication that the applicant saw a medical doctor 
regarding his back problems until May 4, 1976, approximately one year after 
the accident, at which time he saw Dr. N.K. Dean in Price. Dr. Dean referred 
him to Dr. Soderberg in Salt Lake City. Dr. Soderberg saw him for the first 
time on May 7, 1976. He was noted at that time to have mild limitation of 
motion in his back and tenderness in the left buttock. He had decreased 
sensation over the lateral aspect of the calf and foot on the left side but 
his reflexes and straight leg raising tests were normal. Shortly thereafter a 
fusion of his back was recommended but he wanted to wait a while longer. The 
fusion was performed on June 29, 1976. This was a three level fusion, two of 
which apparently failed making it necessary to refuse the back and this was 
done in December of 1977. 
4. After the first surgery, the applicant entered into a 
Compensation Agreement with the insurance carrier dated March 21, 1977. This 
agreement acknowledged that he had received temporary total disability 
compensation from May 12 to June 15, 1975 less two days and again from April 
30, 1976 to December 31, 1976. He also received compensation for permanent 
partial disability based on a rating of 25% of the whole person. At that 
time, no mention was made of any psychiatric problems and no claim for such 
was submitted. The applicant has never returned to work following the surgery 
of June 29, 1976. Prior to the surgery in December of 1977, the applicant 
filed an application for additional benefits specifically noting that a fusion 
had failed and that further surgery was recommended. Liability for the 
additional claim was denied but later the insurance company reversed its 
position and paid for the additional medical expenses and for additional 
temporary total disability through September 7, 1978. No additional permanent 
partial disability was paid because Dr. Soderberg indicated the fusion had 
been made solid by the second surgery and there had been no increase in the 
permanent partial disability. 
5. The applicant received social security disability compensation 
for approximately four years but these payments were discontinued in 1980. 
The termination of the applicant's social security disability benefits may 
have prompted his filing for further workmen's compensation benefits. The 
applicant's claim for such was filed on August 19, 1982 and his claim at that 





6. From the evidence presented, it is clear there has been no 
increase in the applicants permanent partial impairment due to his back 
injury. This was rated at 25% by Dr. Soderberg in 1977 and he reconfirmed his 
opinion as late as 1982. The only evidence of increased impairment relates to 
the ratings recently assigned to his psychiatric impairment which was not 
rated by any physician until March of 1983. This rating was assigned by Dr. 
Frank Dituri,. a specialist in internal medicine, based upon his application of 
the criteria set forth in the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 
published by the American Medical Association and his assessment of the 
applicants psychiatric problems. This evaluation was made without the 
benefit of any of the records from the Four Corners Medical Center and Dr. 
Dituri acknowledged that it would be very helpful to have these records. The 
applicant was later seen by Dr. Jack L. Tedrow, a psychiatrist, who 
essentially confirmed Dr. Dituri*s earlier assessment of a 25% psychiatric 
impairment. Dr. Tedrow recently responded to a request from the 
Administrative Law Judge relative to the onset of this impairment and it is 
obvious from his letter dated August 7, 1984 that he made a mistake with 
respect to the date of the industrial accident. In his original report and in 
two places in his August 7, 1984 report he refers to the accident having 
occurred on March 12, 1979. Obviously, his reference to "finding no evidence 
of ratable impairment as early as January, 1977*% is based on his incorrect 
assumption that this was prior to the industrial accident when in fact it was 
subsequent to the accident and the records of the Four Corners Medical Health 
Center make it rather clear that the applicant did in deed have significant 
psychiatric problems immediately following the industrial accident on March 
12, 1975. A subsequent letter from Dr. Tedrow dated October 12, 1984 
confirmed this typographical error and the pre-existing problem but he could 
not rate it. 
7. In retrospect, with the benefit of hindsight, it appears rather 
evident that the applicant's present problems have been greatly magnified by 
several factors pertaining to the manner in which his case has been handled. 
It seems rather apparent that the applicant's physical impairment resutling 
from his industrial accident was not particularly significant. For more than 
a year after the accident his physical complaints apparently warranted no more 
than periodic chiropractic adjustments and he was able to return to work and 
perform his duties in the mine. Similarly, his understandable psychiatric 
problems and phobic reaction to working in the mine were significantly reduced 
by the treatment he received at the Four Corners Mental Health Canter. The 
consultation received at the Mental Health Center did enable him to return to 
the mine and resume his employment and one might easily have concluded at that 
time that the industrial accident had little long range significance. Now, 
nine years later, the applicant considers himself permanently and totally 
disabled. 
There is absolutely no evidence that the applicant benefited in any 
way from the first surgical procedure and the second surgical procedure was 




surgeries toolc him out of the wort environment and created a real inability to 
work for a period of time, and this, superimposed upon his psychiatric 
problems, have combined to convince him that he is indeed unemployable. 
After this long length of time there is probably no realistic hope 
for reversing this dismal attitude problem although proper psychotherapy at 
the appropriate time may well have been successful. When the applicant became 
disabled as a result of his surgeries, there was obvious justification for his 
determination of total disability by the Social Security Administration but 
this only compounded the problems because it removed him from active 
management as a workmen's compensation claim and did nothing to restore him to 
suitable gainful employment at a time when this was realistically possible. 
The applicant complains that his social security disability benefits were 
terminated but in all likelihood the more realistic tragedy is that he was 
kept on social security disability as long as he was. At the time of the 
accident, the applicant was a young man of only 35 years of age and his 
prospects for rehabilitation should have been excellent. The fact that he 
remains unemployed nine years later is an indictment on the system and the 
applicant's failure or inability to understand the adverse impact of that 
system upon him. Consequently, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the 
applicant was by no means rendered permanently and totally disabled as a 
result of the industrial accident even though the accident combined with the 
circumstances that have followed may well have relegated him to that status. 
8. Because of the foregoing, it is necessary for the Administrative 
Law Judge to view the applicant's claim in three different perspectives: 
(1) Whether or not his present claim for additional compensation based upon 
his psychiatric problems is nothing more than a modification of the 1977 
compensation agreement and therefore not subject to any statute of 
limitations, (2) Whether or not the psychiatric impairment represented a 
significant change in the applicant's condition so as to warrant an award of 
additional compensation under the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission 
conferred by Section 35-1-78 and, if so, whether or not the Commission still 
has jurisdiction to enter such an award more than nine years after the 
accident, and (3) Whether or not the applicant can be found permanently and 
totally disabled as a result of his industrial accident at this time, in which 
case his claim would not be subject to the eight year statute of limitations 
set forth in Section 35-1—66, U.C.A. Addressing the applicant's claim from 
the first two perspectives mentioned, Section 35-1-78 confers continuing 
jurisdiction on the Commission to make . such modification or change with 
respect to former findings or orders as it may from time to time feel 
justified. In the annotation regarding the case of Soencer v. Industrial 
Commission 4 Ut 2d 185, 290 P2d 692, it is noted that even though the 
"doctrine of res judicata...is not in the strict sense applicable to 
proceedings before the Industrial Commission (.)(T)his does not mean that an 
applicant can reapply to the Commission for a new determination upon the same 
facts merely because he may be dissatisfied with his former order, but it does 




invoked, it has authority to entertain further proceedings to deal with any 
substantial changes or unexpected developments that may arise as a result of 
the injury. On this criteria, the Administrative Law Judge finds that this is 
not an appropriate case for further consideration under Section 35-1-78. It 
is rather evident that the same facts have prevailed for approximately the 
last seven years. Even though the psychiatric impairment was not rated until 
relatively recently, the impairment itself was obviously in place long ago. 
The foregoing is deemed dispositive of the first two perspectives. 
As to the third perspective, that of the applicant's claim for permanent total 
disability, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the facts warrant a 
tentative finding of permanent and total disability simply because the 
applicant has not been gainfully employed for the past eight years. The 
Administrative Law Judge is firmly convinced that had appropriate measures 
been taken, the applicant would have been an excellent candidate for 
rehabilitation and would be working today. However his attitude problems may 
be so deeply intrenched that rehabilitation will be difficult if not 
impossible but his age at least is in his favor. At age 44, he is still a 
relatively young man. It is not enough to presume that the applicant can 
obtain suitable gainful employment and under circumstances of this type it is 
incumbant upon the defendants to demonstrate that he is capable of 
rehabilitation. This concept appears to be clearly supported by the case of 
Brundise v. IHL Freight, 622 P2d 790 (1980). 
9. No compensation for permanent total disability is to be awarded 
until a final determination is made relative to whether or not the applicant 
is permanently and totally disabled. In the meantime, he should be referred 
to the Division of Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and 
certification as required by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. It is the recommendation 
of the Administrative Law Judge that the defendants have the applicant 
evaluated at a pain clinic of their choosing and this should be done before 
the evaluation by Rehabilitation Services. Obviously, any other 
rehabilitation services the defendants wish to employ would be appropriate. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant is entitled to a tentative finding of permanent and 
total disability and referral to rehabilitation services as required by 
Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. The facts of this case do not justify a modification 
of the prior compensation agreement entered into in 1977 and the 
Administrative Law Judge does not believe the Commission has jurisdiction to 
consider a claim for increased permanent partial -impairment at this late 
date. This case is clearly distinquishable from the Gamier case on which 
applicant relies. Failure to enter an award within the eight year period 
prescribed by statute in the instant case was not attributable to the 





IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant be found tentatively 
permanently and totally disabled and referred to the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and certification as required 
by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other issues, including a final 
determination of the applicant's candidacy for rehabilitation, attorney's fees 
to be awarded herein, and evidence from any other source pertaining to 
applicant's employability be specifically deferred to a later time, A further 
hearing on the issue of employability will be determined after all of the 
relevant information has been submitted. 
Richard G. Sums ion 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed, by the Industrial Commission of Utah 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
ATTEST: 
this. 'M'1 day of October, 1984. 
•<.4^r}"f rf?'s? 
'Linda J. Strasburg, Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on October ^ S « 1984 a copy of the attached 
AMENDED ORDER was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, 
postage paid: 
Charles G. Oman 
P.O. Box 853 
Castle Dale, Utah 84S13 
A irginius Dabney 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 412, 136 South Main 
Salt Lake. City, Utah 84101 
Henry Chai 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Gilbert Martinez, Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By Sher?T 
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Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 24, 
1984 at 1:00 p.m. o'clock. Said hearing was pursuant 
to Order and.Notice of the Commission. 
Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and represented by Virginius 
Dabney, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants, Peabody Coal Company and/or Old 
Republic Insurance, were represented by Henry Chai, 
Attorney at Law. 
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Gilbert 
Martinez, Administrator. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The applicant herein was injured in an industrial accident on May 
12, 1975 during the course of his employment by Peabody Coal Company. The 
occurrence of the accident is not questioned but the extent of injuries 
sustained as a result of the accident are subject to considerable doubt. 
2. The accident involved a cave-in in which three of the miners lost 
their lives and others were injured. One of those who was killed was only a 
few feet away from the applicant and was trying to rescue others at the time 
he was killed. The applicant may not have been able to prevent him from 
getting into the situation leading to his death, but apparently the applicant 
felt that he could have prevented him from doing so and this has caused him to 
have a lot of guilt feelings. After this employee was killed in the cave-in 
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the applicant turned to run and was struck across the back by one of the mine 
timbers. One might suspect that the applicant would have been seriously 
injured by this timber but there was certainly no immediate indication of 
such* The applicant did say that he experienced a lot of low back pain but on 
the other hand he continued working in the search and rescue effort for three 
or four more hours and when he finally did go to the Emery Medical Center his 
main complaints were emotional not physical. The night of the accident, he 
was treated for hyperventilation and given Valium and the Clinic did not even 
make note of any low back pain or injury. In fact, the applicant was in such 
a state of emotional unrest and confusion that he drove to Page, Arizona for 
unknown reasons. His wife was so concerned about him that she followed him to 
Page. However, the applicant was seen by a chiropractor in Price on May 15, 
1975 and was treated for Htraumatic lumbo sacral sprain with radiculitis 
unilateral on the left side*** He continued seeing a chiropractor quite 
regularly for the next several months. Because of his depression, he also 
went to the Four Corners Mental Health Clinic in Price. There he complained 
of restlessness and feelings of anxiety and nervousness and an unwillingness 
to go back into the mine. He complained of not sleeping and having dreams of 
the horrible incident at the mine. He was also having marital problems and he 
embarked upon a course of psychotherapy for the purpose of getting him back 
into the mine and helping him with his marriage. This program was successful 
and he did return to work in the mine by June 15. He then worked without 
interruption until around April of 1976. During that time he continued to 
obtain some chiropractic adjustments but it is unknown as to just what extent 
or at what frequency these adjustments were administered. The records of the 
chiropractor, now deceased, have not been located. 
3. There is no indication that the applicant saw a medical doctor 
regarding his back problems until May A, 1976, approximately one year after 
the accident, at which time he saw Dr. N.K. Dean in Price. Dr. Dean referred 
him to Dr. Soderberg in Salt Lake City. Dr. Soderberg saw him for the first 
time on May 7, 1976. He was noted at that time to have mild limitation of 
motion in his back and tenderness in the left buttock. He had decreased 
sensation over the lateral aspect of the calf and foot on the left side but 
his reflexes and straight leg raising tests were normal. Shortly thereafter a 
fusion of his back was recommended but he wanted to wait a while longer. The 
fusion was performed on June 29, 1976. This was a three level fusion, two of 
which apparently failed making it necessary to refuse the back and this was 
done in December of 1977. 
4. After the first surgery, the applicant entered into a 
Compensation Agreement with the insurance carrier dated March 21, 1977. This 
agreement acknowledged that he had received temporary total disability 
compensation from May 12 to June 15, 1975 less two days and again from April 
30, 1976 to December 31, 1976. He also received compensation for permanent 
partial disability based on a rating of 25% of the whole person. At that 
time, no mention was made of any psychiatric problems and no claim for such 
was submitted. The applicant has never returned to work following the surgery 
VJ .J 
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0g j u n e 29, 1976. Prior to the surgery in December of 197 7f the applicant 
filed an application for additional benefits specifically noting that a fusion 
had failed and that further surgery was recommended- Liability for the 
additional claim was denied but later the insurance company reversed its 
position and paid for the additional medical expenses and for additional 
temporary total disability through September 7, .1978. No additional permanent 
partial disability was paid because Dr. Soderberg indicated the fusion had 
been made solid by the second surgery and there had been no increase in the 
permanent partial disability. 
5. The applicant received social security disability compensation 
for approximately four years but these payments were discontinued in 1980. 
The termination of the applicant's social security disability benefits may 
have prompted his filing for further workmen's compensation benefits. The 
applicant's claim for such was filed on August 19, 1982 and his claim at that 
time was for additional permanent partial disability or permanent total 
disability. 
6. From the evidence presented, it is clear there has been no 
increase in the applicant* s.^  permanent partial impairment due to his back 
injury. This was rated at 25% by Dr. Soderberg in 1977 and he reconfirmed his 
opinion as late as 1982, The only evidence of increased impairment relates to 
the ratings recently assigned to his psychiatric impairment which was not 
rated by any physician until March of 1983. This rating was assigned by Dr. 
Frank Dituri, a specialist in internal medicine, based upon his application of 
the criteria set forth in the Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 
published by the American Medical Association and his assessment of the 
applicant's psychiatric problems. This evaluation was made without the 
benefit of any of the records from the Four Corners Medical Center and Dr. 
Dituri acknowledged that it would be very helpful to have these records. The 
applicant was later seen by Dr. Jack L. Tedrow, a psychiatrist, who 
essentially confirmed Dr. Dituri*s earlier assessment of a 25% psychiatric 
impairment. Dr. Dituri recently responded to a request from the 
Administrative Law Judge relative to the onset of this impairment and it is 
obvious from his letter dated August 7, 1984 that he made a mistake with 
respect to the date of the industrial accident. In his original report and in 
two places in his August 7, 1984 report he refers to the accident as having 
occurred on March 12, 1979. Obviously, his records to finding no evidence of 
ratable impairment as en rly as January, 1977 is based on his incorrect 
assumption that this was prior to the industrial accident when in fact it was 
subsequent to the accident and the records of the Four Corners Medical Health 
Center make it rather clear that the applicant did in deed have significant 
psychiatric problems immediately following the industrial accident on,, March 
12, 1975. 
7. In retrospect, with the benefit of hindsight, it appears rather 
evident that the applicant's present problems have been greatly magnified by 
several factors pertaining to the manner in which his case has been handled. 
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It seems rather apparent that the applicant's physical impairment resutling 
from his industrial accident was not particularly significant. For more than 
a year after the accident his physical complaints apparently warranted no more 
than periodic chiropractic adjustments and he was able to return to work and 
perform his duties in the mine. Similarly, his understandable psychiatric 
problems and phobic reaction to working in the mine were significantly reduced 
by the treatment he received at the Four Corners Mental Health Center. The 
consultation received at the Mental Health Center did enable him to return to 
the mine and resume his employment and one might easily have concluded at that 
time that the industrial accident had little, long range significance. Now, 
nine years later, the applicant considers himself permanently and totally 
disabled. 
There is absolutely no evidence that the applicant benefited in any 
way from the first surgical procedure and the second surgical procedure was 
only beneficial in the sense of correcting the pseudo-arthrosis. The 
surgeries took him out of the work environment and created a real inability to 
work for a period of time, and this, superimposed upon his psychiatric 
problems, have combined to convince him that he is indeed unemployable. 
After this long length of"-time there is probably no realistic hope 
for reversing this dismal attitude problem although proper psychotherapy at 
the appropriate time may well have been successful. When the applicant became 
disabled as a result of his surgeries, there was obvious justification for his 
determination of total disability by the Social Security Administration but 
this only compounded the problems because it removed him ^from active 
management as a workmen's compensation claim and did nothing to restore him to 
suitable gainful employment at a time when this was realistically possible. 
The applicant complains that his social security disability benefits were 
terminated but in all likelihood the more realistic tragedy is that he was 
kept on social security disability as long as he was. At the time of the 
accident, the applicant was a young man of only 35 years of age and his 
prospects for rehabilitation should have been excellent. The fact that he 
remains unemployed nine years later is an indictment on the system and the 
applicant's failure or inability to understand the adverse impact of that 
system upon him. Consequently, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the 
applicant was by no means rendered permanently and totally disabled as a 
result of the industrial accident even though the accident combined with the 
circumstances that have followed may well have relegated him to that status. 
8. Because of the foregoing, it is necessary for the Administrative 
Law Judge to view the applicant's claim in three different perspectives: 
(1) Whether or not his present claim for additional compensation based upon 
his psychiatric problems is nothing more than a modification of the 1977 
compensation agreement and therefore not subject to any statute of 
limitations, (2) Whether or not the psychiatric impairment represented a 
significant change in the applicant's condition so as to warrant an award of 
additional compensation under the continuing jurisdiction of the Commission 
conferred by Section 35-1-78 and, if so, whether or not the Commission still 
has jurisdiction to enter such an award more than nine years after the 
accident, and (3) Whether or not the applicant can be found permanently and 
CHARLES G. OMAN 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
PAGE FIVE 
totally disabled as a result of his industrial accident at this time, in which 
case his claim would not be subject to the eight year statute of limitations 
set forth in Section 35-1-66, U.C.A. Addressing the applicant's claim from 
the first two perspectives mentioned, Section 35-1-78 confers continuing 
jurisdiction on the Commission to make such modification or change with 
respect to former findings or orders as it may from time to time feel 
justified. In the annotation regarding the case of Spencer v. Industrial 
Commission 4 Ut 2d 135, 290 P2d 692, it is noted that even though the 
"doctrine of res judicata,„.is not in the strict sense applicable to 
proceedings before the Industrial Commission (.)(T)his does not mean that an 
applicant can reapply to the Commission for a new determination upon the same 
facts merely because he may be dissatisfied with his former order, but it does 
mean once the application has been filed and the Commission's jurisdiction 
invoked, it has authority to entertain further proceedings to deal with any 
substantial changes or unexpected developments that may arise as a result of 
the injury. On this criteria, the Administrative Law Judge finds that this is 
not an appropriate case for further consideration under Section 35-1-78. It 
is rather evident that the same facts have prevailed for approximately the 
last seven years. Even though the psychiatric impairment was not rated until 
relatively recently, the impairment itself was obviously in place long ago. 
The foregoing is deemed dispositive of the first two perspectives. 
As to the third perspective, that of the applicant's claim for permanent total 
disability, the Administrative Law Judge finds that the facts- warrant a 
tentative finding of permanent and total disability simply because the 
applicant has not been gainfully employed for the past eight years, The 
Administrative Law Judge is firmly convinced that had appropriate measures 
been taken, the applicant would have been an excellent candidate for 
rehabilitation and would be working today. However his attitude problems may 
be so deeply intrenched that rehabilitation will be difficult if not 
impossible but his age at least is in his favor. At age 44, he is still a 
relatively young man. It is not enough to presume that the applicant can 
obtain suitable gainful employment and under circumstances of this type it is 
incumbent upon the defendants to demonstrate that he is capable of 
rehabilitation. This concept appears to be clearly supported by the case of 
Brundige v. IML Freight. 622 P2d 790 (1980). 
9. No compensation for permanent total disability is to be awarded 
until a final determination is made relative to whether or not the applicant 
is permanently and totally disabled. In the meantime, he should be referred 
to the Division of Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and 
certification as required by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. It is the recommendation 
of the Administrative Law Judge that the defendants have the applicant 
evaluated at a pain clinic of their choosing and this should be done before 
the evaluation by Rehabilitation Services. Obviously, any other 
rehabilitation services the defendants wish to employ would be appropriate. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant is entitled to a tentative finding of permanent and 
total disability and referral to rehabilitation services as required by 
Section 35-1-67, U,C.A. The facts of this case do not justify a modification 
of the prior compensation agreement entered into in 1977 and the 
Administrative Law Judge does not believe the Commission has jurisdiction to 
consider a claim for increased permanent partial impairment at this late 
date. This case is clearly distinquishable from the Gamier case on which 
applicant relies. Failure to enter an award within the eight year period 
prescribed by statute in the instant case was not attributable to the 
Commission's inability to do so. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant be found tentatively 
permanently and totally disabled and referred to the Division of 
Rehabilitation Services for evaluation, training and certification as required 
by Section 35-1-67, U.C.A. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other issues, including a final 
determination of the applicant's candidacy for rehabilitation, attorney's fees 
to be awarded herein, and evidence from any other source pertaining to 
applicant's employability be specifically deferred to a later time.^  A further 
hearing on the issue of employability will be determined after all of the 
relevant information has been submitted. 
Richard G, Sumsion 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission of Utah 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this cft**day of October, 1984, 
ATTEST: 
/Linda J. Strasburg. Commission Se'cn cretary 
!/ 1/ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on October ffi . 1984 a copy of the attached ORDER 
was mail ed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Charles G. Oman 
P.O. Box 853 
Castle Dale, Ut 34513 
Virginias Dabney 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 412, 136 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Henry Chai 
Attorney at Law 
P 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Gilbert Martinez, Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
By Sherry 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 35-1-67 (1986) 
In cases of permanent total disability the employee shall 
receive 66 2/3% of his average weekly wages at the time of the 
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than 
a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 
for each dependent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four dependent minor children not to exceed the aver-
age weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but 
not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week. However, in no case of permanent total 
disability shall the employer or its insurance carrier be re-
quired to pay weekly compensation payments for more than 312 
weeks. A finding by the commission of permanent total disability 
shall in all cases be tentative and not final until such time as 
the following proceedings have been had: If the employee has 
tentatively been found to be permanently and totally disabled, it 
shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of Utah refer 
the employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under 
the state board of eduation for rehabilitation training and it 
shall be the duty of the commission to order paid to the voca-
tional rehabilitation division, out of the second injury fund 
provided for by Subsection 35-1-68(1), not to exceed $1,000 for 
use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee; the re-
habilitation and training of the employee shall generally follow 
the practice applicable under Section 35-1-69, relating to the 
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If the 
division f vocational rel ib litaticr un ier the stat^ koiri of 
education certifies to the industrial commission of Utah in writ-
ing that the employee has fully cooperated with the division of 
vocational rehabilitation in it et forts t -i r "hil* i I \ tate rum, and 
in the opinion of the division the employee may not be rehabili-
tated, the commission shall order that there be paid to the em-
ployee v/eekly benefits at the rate of 66 2/ 3% of his average 
weekly wages at the time ot the injury, but not more than a maxi-
mum ot 8ci^  uf the stafp averagp \yipRly \nqe it the t i IP f the 
injury per week and not lebs than a minimum of $4 5 per week plus 
$5 for i dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child 
undpr t tu i |* H H.iLs j|> i i minimum t I it dependent 
minor children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the em-
ployee at the titxip ot the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the 
^tate i /Fraqi u^ekJy waqe it the time ot the injury per week out 
ot the second injury fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68(1), 
for such period of time beginninq with t H time that thp pay-
ments, \m in this section provided, to bp made by the employer or 
its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of the 
employee. No employee shall hp entitled in w such benefits if 
he tails or refuses to cooperate with the division of vocational 
rehabilitation under this section. 
All persons who arp permanently ind •"italic iisabled and 
entitled to benefits from the second injury fund under Subsection 
35-1-68(1), including those injured prior 4o March 6, 1949, shall 
rDceiv«- i )f ]fs it jn "un per wne; *N-*n i =i L 1 un*.y b1 the second 
injury fund, or when combined with compensation payments of the 
employer or the insurance carrier. The division of vocational 
rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the vocational train-
ing of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah 
the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the 
commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity 
to be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding 
such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands 
or both arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any 
two thereof, constitutes total and permanent disability, to be 
compensated according to the provisions of this section and no 
tentative finding of permanent total disability is required in 
those instances. In all other cases where there has been rehab-
ilitation effected but where there is some loss of bodily func-
tion, the award shall be based upon partial permanent disabil-
ity. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be 
required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities 
of any kind as provided in Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this 
section, including loss of function, in excess of 85% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for 
312 weeks. 
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Factually, this case resembles Nuzum v. 
Roosendahl Construction & Mining Corpor-
ation, 565 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977), where the 
plaintiffs decedent died from a heart attack 
after manually operating a stuck dumper by 
climbing in and out of a six-foot cab to 
release the load. This Court in that case held 
that the internal failure was a direct result of 
the just-described exertion. As in that case, 
the issue here is whether Miera was injured 
"by accident arising out of or in the course of 
his employment'' as provided by U.C.A., 
1953, §35-1-45. The administrative law 
judge found that an industrial injury had 
occurred, but denied compensation because 
she questioned the accidental nature of the 
injury. 
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, 46 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 3 (11/14/86), we redefined the 
unexpected result of a work-related activity 
as a compensable accident if both medical 
and legal causation could be shown. Applied 
to the instant case, the legal causation test is 
satisfied, even though Miera's history of 
spondylolisthesis places him in a personal risk 
situation. His jumps into an eight-foot hole 
from a four-foot platform at thirty-minute 
intervals constitute a considerably greater 
exertion than that encountered in non-
employment life and are therefore legally 
sufficient. The medical causation test is like-
wise satisfied by the medical panel's finding 
that "the work activities as described over a 
three-day period could produce a lumbar 
sprain aggravating the preexisting problem he 
had had." No more is needed to hold that 
Miera suffered a compensable industrial 
accident. 
The case is remanded for a medical evalu-
ation of Miera*s industrial injury in propor-
tion to his previous disability and a commen-
surate apportionment of benefit payments 
between the Second Injury Fund and the 
State Insurance Fund. Costs are awarded to 
Miera. 
WE CONCUR 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
Stewart, Justice, concurs in the result. 
Cite as 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Brace D. NOR ION 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of the 
STATE OF UTAH, UNITED STATES 
STEEL CORPORATION [Self-insured 
Employer], and the SECOND INJURY 
FUND of the STATE of UTAH, 
Defendants. 
No. 21017 
FILED: Novemver 25, 1986 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ATTORNEYS: 
Virginius Dabney for Plaintiff 
David L. Wilkinson, Erie Boorman, Phil N. 
Walker for Defendants 
PER CURIAM: 
In this petition for review, petitioner Bruce 
D. Norton challenges the decision of the 
Industrial Commission denying his claim for 
permanent total disability. Norton contends 
that the Commission erroneously based its 
findings on medical impairment alone 
without examining his earning capacity, 
ignored his total disability under the "odd-
lot" doctrine, and ruled contrary to the evid-
ence produced by him in support of his 
claim. None of the defendant parties has filed 
a response. We reverse and remand for a 
hearing consistent with this opinion. Norton 
was employed as a coal miner of United 
States 
Steel in East Carbon, Utah, for thirty-nine 
years of his life. He was sixteen years old 
when he began working full-time in 1943 and 
fifty-six when he stopped working in 1983. 
He earned a living throughout those years by 
dint of his brawn, performing arduous phys-
ical labor that required little, if any, skills. 
Norton's literacy is marginal at best. 
On August 10, 1977, Norton sustained an 
injury to his neck and shoulder when a pulley 
malfunctioned and sent a heavy cable cras-
hing down on his neck with such force that 
his face was embedded in the coal and he had 
to be pried out from under the cable by his 
companions. Initial diagnosis was contusion 
over base'of neck, no fracture. Norton retu-
rned to work after one week wearing a soft 
collar. Because' of persistent pain, he was 
given a myelogram in December which 
showed a herniated disc at C5-C6 interspace 
and right shoulder traumatic bursitis. Mode-
rate irritation of the right C6-C7 nerve roots 
was found as well. Traction and heat were 
prescribed as conservative treatment, with a 
possibility of surgery indicated. Norton cont-
inued to suffer persistent headaches and neck 
pain which have worsened with time, appare-
ntly symptoms of residual spondylosis and 
spurring. His company physician advised him 
For cumulative UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, sec the second section of this issue. 
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that the day would come when he would want 
to have surgery. Norton was reluctant to take 
that step and informed his supervisor that 
inasmuch as he had elected not to have 
surgery, he should also take himself off 
compensation and return to work. 
Throughout his remaining working years, 
Norton intermittently underwent traction and 
. physical therapy, wore a back brace, and 
took pain medication. During the last eigh-
teen months of his work his legs felt numb 
whenever he turned slightly, and at one point 
he experienced a fifteen to twenty minute 
paralysis of his left lower extremity. His left-
hand grip and strength of the left arm conti-
nued to decrease to a point where he would 
drop objects and frequently lose feeling in his 
fingers at night. Nonetheless, he worked until 
March of 1983 when he took a medical retir-
ement. 
Norton's prior injuries included a broken 
back when he was thirteen years old, resul-
ting in lumbar spine degenerative joint 
disease, right ankle traumatic arthritis stem-
ming from a broken ankle, bilateral inguinal 
hernia for which he has been in surgery three 
times, hyperacidity with history of duodenal 
ulcer and focal skin cancers. Impairments 
developed after the industrial injury include 
tendovaginitis of the right little finger, pulm-
onary allergic bronchitis, and hypertensive 
car-diovascular disease with cardiomyopathy 
aggravated by life-long obesity. 
Norton was pronounced ineligible for 
rehabilitation by the Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation before the Commission rend-
ered its final decision. 
Basing his findings of facts and conclusions 
,of law partially upon the report of a medical 
panel and partially upon the report of Nort-
on's own physicians, the administrative law 
judge found a 14% whole man impairment 
attributable to preexisting conditions, a 10% 
uncombined permanent physical impairment 
as a result of the industrial accident, raising 
•the overall impairment to 23% of the whole 
man, and a 31% impairment as a result of all 
causes that developed subsequent to the 
industrial accident. l The administrative law 
judge then concluded that this impairment 
construed in a light most favorable to Norton 
did not require a finding of permanent total 
disability. The administrative law judge noted 
the impairments that followed the industrial 
accident, stressed the fact that Norton conti-
nued to work for six more years after the 
accident, concluded that the evidence clearly 
did not warrant a determination that Norton 
was permanently and totally disabled as a 
consequence of his industrial accident and 
therefore denied that claim. Nowhere in the 
findings, conclusions and order, or in the 
affirmance of that order by the Board of 
Review is there any mention about Norton's 
eligibility for rehabilitation. No findings were 
made on Norton's earning capacity in his 
field of endeavor or elsewhere. It is this lack 
of findings that mandates a reversal and 
remand for further proceedings. 
Under our well-settled standard of review, 
we are limited to determining whether the 
Commission's findings are supported by 
substantial evidence. Hardman v. Salt Lake 
City Fleet Management, 41 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 
(1986) (citations omitted). But where the 
findings of fact do not support the award, 
this Court may set aside the Commission's 
award. U.C.A., 1953, §35-1-84(2). 
As in Hardman, supra, where it confused 
the percentage of impairment, a medical 
finding, with the percentage of disability, an 
administrative evaluation of earning capacity, 
the Commission again failed in this case to 
carry out its task. It adopted with slight 
modification the findings of impairment 
reported by the medical panel but then failed 
in its administrative responsibility and func-
tion to evaluate Norton's permanent disabili-
ty, which should have included such factors 
as Norton's "present and future ability to 
engage in gainful activity as it is affected by 
such diverse factors as age, sex, education, 
economic and social environment, in addition 
to the definite medical factor-permanent 
impairment." 2 As this Court has stated in 
Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 
208,211 (Utah 1984): 
This ability is evaluated not in the 
abstract, but in terms of the specific 
individual who has suffered a work 
related injury .... [I]n assessing the 
lack of earning capacity, a constella-
tion of factors must be considered, 
only one of which is the physical 
impairment. Other factors are age, 
education, training and mental capa-
cities. [Citations omitted.] It is the 
unique configuration of these factors 
that together will determine the 
impact of the impairment on the 
individual's earning capacity. 
Accord Hardman, at 9. No mention is made 
of those other factors here, in spite of the 
fact that the Commission had before it the 
evaluation of the Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation that spells out Norton's voca-
tional history, educational limitations, lear-
ning disability and age "in concert with his 
multiple disabling conditions and a need for 
total re-education." That evaluation presents 
prima facie evidence that Norton, while not 
altogether incapacitated for work, is so 
handicapped that he will not be employed 
regularly in any well-known branch of the 
labor marketJVfarsha/i, at 212, and therefore 
falls into the so-called "odd-lot" category-
Hardman, at 10. 
For UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, see the second section of this issue. 
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With respect to the administrative law 
judge's finding that Norton's continued work 
for six years was proof that he was not 
permanently totally disabled in 1983, it 
should be pointed out that that fact standing 
alone does not foreclose Norton's claim. The 
administrative law judge correctly considered 
Norton's return to work as one factor to be 
weighed in determining his disability. He 
erred when he failed to consider the condition 
under which Norton continued his employ-
ment, as manifested by his finding "the very 
fact that the applicant continued to work in 
underground mining for six years following 
his accident is convincing evidence that his 
accident did not render him permanently and 
totally disabled." Norton's decision to return 
to work did not automatically disqualify him 
from receiving permanent total disability 
benefits, where the facts indicate that throu-
ghout the remainder of his employ he was not 
restored to health. The evidence is undisputed 
that Norton spent the last six of his working 
years in considerable pain. Provided that a 
worker's disability was also analyzed within 
the framework of the odd-lot doctrine, case 
law dealing with the factor of substantial 
pain has generally held that "[a] worker who 
cannot return to any gainful employment 
without suffering substantial pain is entitled 
to compensation benefits for total disability." 
Comeaux v. Cameron Offshore Services, 
Inc., 420 So. 2d 1209 (La. App. 1982). 
The presence of substantial pain may 
logically cause an injured worker to 
fall into this odd-lot category, inas-
much as it directly affects the prob-
able dependability with which the 
injured worker can sell his services in 
a competitive labor market, undisto-
rted by such factors as business 
booms, sympathy of a particular 
employer or friends, temporary luck, 
or the superhuman efforts of the 
claimant to rise above his crippling 
handicaps. 
Calogero v. City of New Orleans, 397 So. 2d 
1252, 1254 (La. 1980), modified 434 So. 2d 
177 (benefits affirmed on substantial pain 
theory alone), citing L.A. Larson, The Law 
of Workmen's Compensation §10-164.49 
(1980). The probability of future impairment 
of future earning capacity as indicated by the 
nature of the injury, the age of the worker, 
and other relevant factors must likewise be 
assessed. Island Creek Coal Co. v. Taylor, 
468 S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1971). See also Harwell 
v Argonaut Insurance Co., 296 Or. 505, 678 
P.2d 1202 (1984); Tsuchiyama v. Kahului 
Trucking and Storage, Inc., 2 Hawaii App. 
659, 638 P.2d 1381 (1982); Smith v. Indust-
rial Commission, 113 Ariz. 304, 552 P.2d 
1198 (1976). Only where the employee returns 
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to work under normal conditions will the 
presumption of no loss of earning capacity 
stay unassailed. Midland-Ross Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission, 107 Ariz. 311, 486 
P.2d-793 (1971). 
It may be years before the effect is 
felt. But a man with a stiffened arm 
or damaged back or badly weakened 
eye will presumably have a harder 
time doing his work well and meeting 
the competition of young and healthy 
men. When a man stands before the 
worker's compensation court with 
proven permanent physical injuries, 
for which the exclusive remedy has 
abolished all possibility of common 
law damages, it is not justifiable to 
tell him he has undergone no impair-
ment of earning capacity, solely on 
the strength of current paychecks. 
Cleveland v. Cyprus Industrial Minerals, 196 
Mont. 15, 636 P.2d 1386 (1981), citing Fermo 
v. Superiine Products, 175 Mont. 345, 574 
P.2d 251 (1978). It need not be restated at 
great length that the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act is to be liberally construed and that 
any doubt with respect to the right of comp-
ensation will be resolved in favor of the 
injured employee. State Tax Commission v. 
Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 
1984); McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 
P.2d 153 (Utah 1977). 
Upon remand the Commission is required 
to address Norton's disability in light of all 
factors mentioned ante, and the burden will 
be on the employer to prove the existence of 
regular, steady work that Norton could 
perform, taking into account his age, limited 
education, and functional illiteracy, as well as 
his disabling pain. Contrary to the Commiss-
ion's disclaimer noted in Northwest Carriers, 
at 140 n.3, permanent impairment alone is 
never the sole or real criterion of permanent 
disability, and a denial of permanent total 
disability based on it alone invites reversal 
under well-settled stare decisis. 
The matter is remanded for further proce-
edings consistent with this opinion 
1. Norton's challenge to the percentages 
found by the medical panel and adopted by 
the administrative law judge must be rejected. 
The rating is proper under the formula expl-
ained in Second Injury Fund v. Perry's Mill 
and Cabinet Shop, 684 P.2d 1269 (Utah 
1984), and Jacobsen Construction v. Hair, 
667 P.2d 25 (Utah 1983). 
2. See the Commission's own explanation 
of the difference between impairment and 
disability in Northwest Carriers Inc. v. Indu-
strial Commission, 639 P.2d 138, 140 n.3 
(Utah 1981). 
>, see the second section of this issue. For cumulative UTAH CODE ANNOTATI 
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GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT * 
(Se l f I n s u r e d ) and * 
SECOND INJURY FUND, * 
D e f e n d a n t s . * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On September 12, 1986, an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission 
issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order awarding the 
applicant in the above captioned case permanent total disability benefits. 
The Order states that the self-insured employer was to begin paying benefits 
as of the date of injury, August 29, 1984, and continue until October 22, 
1984, the date the applicant temporarily returned to work. No benefits were 
awarded for the period during which the applicant worked- (October 22, 1984 
through June 7, 1985). The Order specifies that the self-insured employer was 
to begin paying benefits again on June 8, 1985, the day after the applicant's 
final day at work. . The self-insured employer was ordered to continue paying 
benefits until May 21, 1987, when the employer's portion of the permanent 
total disability payments ($28,828.80) would be. complete. The Second Injury 
Fund was ordered to begin paying permanent total disability benefits to the 
applicant on May 22, 1987. 
On September 24, 1986, the counsel for the defendant/self-insured 
employer filed a one sentence Motion for Review requesting the Commission to 
review the Administrative Law Judge's Order. No specific errors were cited. 
On September 25, 1986, the counsel for the applicant filed a Motion for Review 
stating that it was error for the Administrative Law Judge to fail to order 
interest be paid on the accrued permanent total disability benefits. On 
September 30, 1986, the Second Injury Fund filed a motion for review 
indicating that the Administrative Law Judge incorrectly ordered benefits to 
begin on the date of injury, August 29, 1984 as opposed to on the day 
following the applicant's last day worked, June 7, 1985. Finally, on October 
3
, 1986, the defendant/self-insured employer filed a Brief in support of the 
September 24, 1986 Motion for review. The Brief stakes it was error for the 
Administrative Law Judge to adopt the medical panel finding that the applicant 
could no longer perform vocational teaching in upholstery as the treating 
Physicians had found otherwise. 
The Commission finds three issues have been raised by the several 
Motions for Review; 
GRANTING APPLICANT'S MID 
SECOND INJURY FUND'S 
MOTIONS FOR REVIEW AND 
DENYING DEFENDANT/EMPLOYER'S 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
:RNOM E. BRUNDAGE 
1NYING DEFENDENT MOTION FOR REVIEW 
LGE TWO 
1. Whether it was error for the Administrative Law Judge to find 
the applicant permanently totally disabled in relying on the 
medical panel as opposed to the treating physicians. 
2. On what date should permanent total disabi lity benefits begin 
3. . Whether interest should be awarded on the accrued benefits. 
Addressing first the issue raised by the defendant/self-insured 
^ployer, the Commission finds it must deny this motion. The Administrative 
iw Judge is never bound by the findings or opinions set forth by the treating 
lysicians. The medical panel is utilized to provide compentent unbiased 
lalysis of the medical aspects of the case, and reliance on the medical panel 
j correct unless there is some good reason shown why the medical panel*s 
>port should not be given credit. The counsel for the defendant/self-insured 
.iployer has given no reason why the medical panel report should be rejected, 
id therefore, the Commission must affirm the Administrative Law Judge's 
iliance on the medical panel report, and thus, affirm the findings of 
Minanent total disability. 
Addressing the issue of the date when permanent total disability 
mefits are to begin, the Commission must agree with the Administrator of the 
icond Injury Fund. It is inconsistent to find the applicant to be 
*rmanently totally disabled if he in fact can and does work. It is more 
msistent and logical to find that the permanent total disability did not 
igin until after the applicant stopped working. Therefore, the self-insured 
tiployer's portion of the permanent total disability benefits should be paid 
^ginning June 8, 1985, the day following the last day worked, and continuing 
)r 109.2 weeks until July 12, 1987. The $2,391.45 in temporary total 
Mitpensation already paid by the employer should be considered an advance on 
le employer's total liability for permanent total disability benefits. The 
ciount of $2,391.45 subtracted from the employer's total liability of 
£8,828.80 equals $26,437.35. Therefore, the employer shall pay $242.10 per 
iek for 109.2 weeks from June 8, 1985 through July 12, 1987, totaling 
£6,437.35. Beginning July 13, 1987, the Second Injury Fund shall begin 
lying the applicant $264.00 per week, 
With respect to the interest issue, the Commission finds the 
Latutorily allowed interest shall be added to the accrued benefits payable by 
le self-insured employer. The Administrative Law Judge's September 12, 1986 
rder is therefore amended to read as follows; 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant, Granite School District, 
lall pay the applicant, Vernon E. Brundage, compensation at the rate of 
£42.10 per week for 109.2 weeks fcr a total of $26,437.35 as compensation for 
ranite School District's 15/43 or 15% share of the ^applicant's permanent 
>tal disability benefits resulting from the industrial accident of August 28, 
*84; said benefits to commence effective June 8, 1985 and to continue through 
ily 12, 1987. 
VERNON E. BRUNDAGE 
DENYING DEFENDENT HOTION FOR REVIEW 
PAGE THREE 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant, Granite School District, 
shall pay interest on the accrued benefits in the amount of 8% per annum from 
the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant, Granite School District, 
shall pay all reasonable medical expenses incurred by the applicant as a 
direct result of the industrial accident of August 28, 1984; said expenses to 
be paid in accordance with the medical and surgical fee schedule of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant, Granite School District, 
shall pay Arthur F. Sandack, attorney for the applicant, the sum of 
$10,247.65, as attorney fees in this case for a permanent total disability 
award, pursuant to Section 35-1-87; said amount to be deducted by the 
defendant employer from the aforesaid award of the applicant and to be paid 
directly to the attorney. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Second Injury 
Fund prepare the necessary vouchers directing the State Treasurer, as 
Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, to place the applicant, Vernon E. 
Brundage, on the Second Injury Fund payroll effective July 13, 1987, with 
payments to be made at the rate of $264.00 per week for as long as the 
applicant shall live, or until further notice of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah. 
^ I m^w^M^ Stephen ^M. Hadley Chairmatw 
4 
Walter T, A x e l g r a d £ / 
Commissioner 
Lenicfe L* Nielsen 
Commissioner 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
— [ 0 — day of November, 1986. 
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